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Technology-driven 
virtual immigration 
has held up better 
than traditional 
physical immigration.
Labor Market Globalization 
in the Recession and Beyond
by W. Michael Cox, Richard Alm and Justyna Dymerska
In recent decades, technology and trade liberalization have propelled 
globalization in product and financial markets, leading to substantial gains in 
international trade and capital flows. labor market globalization has proceeded 
at a slower pace, largely because restrictive immigration policies hinder workers’ 
movement across borders.
Today’s computer and telecommunications technologies have pro-
vided a way to circumvent barriers to labor market globalization’s traditional 
mode—the physical immigration that brings the workers to the work. This 
virtual immigration moves the work rather than the workers, and it typically 
involves the long-distance delivery of services.
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services  from  high-wage  countries  to 
low-wage ones. Second, it has allowed 
highly  paid  workers  in  the  U.S.  and 
other wealthy countries to sell sophisti-
cated services around the world.
Both physical and virtual 
immigration have contributed to 
globalization of the labor force 
over the past quarter century. This 
integration has largely taken place 
in good times, where unemploy-
ment has been low and the num-
ber of jobs has been increasing, 
particularly in the U.S. Recessions 
have been brief and shallow.
In the past two years, however, 
the economic climate has changed 
dramatically. Recession has spread 
to most parts of the world, slow-
ing or even reversing globaliza-
tion’s momentum. Trade has been 
squeezed. Financial flows have 
been contracting. The slowdown 
has also taken a toll on both physi-
cal and virtual immigration—a con-
sequence largely related to market 
forces rather than inward-looking 
policies to preserve existing jobs.
In recovery, the long-term fac-
tors supporting cross-border inte-
gration of trade, finance and labor 
are likely to reemerge, although 
it may take time to fully restore 
globalization’s momentum. The 
outlook could change if hard times 
linger and countries succumb 
to protectionist temptations, set-
ting off a destructive process of 
deglobalization.
Labor Goes Global
The World Bank describes 
three waves of globalization.1 The 
first came between 1870 and 1914, 
and the second from 1950 to 1980. 
The third and current wave began 
in 1980, triggered by the entry of 
many developing countries into 
the global marketplace, declining 
transportation costs and revolu-
tionary innovations in information 
technology.
The third wave, like the two 
globalizations that preceded it, 
brought a surge in physical immi-
gration. As the world economy 
grew in recent decades, workers 
moved across borders in search of 
better jobs—from Latin America to 
the U.S., from Eastern to Western 
Europe and from South Asia to the 
Middle East and elsewhere.
Data on global labor flows 
are sketchy, but United Nations 
estimates for net annual immigra-
tion from developing to developed 
regions show a sharp third-wave 
spike from 1.1 million in the early 
1980s to 3.2 million in the first half 
of this decade. An estimated 100 
million people are working outside 
their home countries, about 3 per-
cent of the global labor force.2
We’re on firmer ground in 
tracking the U.S. immigrant labor 
force. The latest data, covering both 
legal and illegal workers, show an 
increase of 68 percent to 24 million 
in the past 12 years.3 As a share of 
the labor force, the foreign born 
rose from 10.8 percent in 1996 to 
15.6 percent in 2008 (Chart 1).
Any accounting of physi-
cal migration underestimates the 
impulse toward labor market glo-
balization. Many more workers 
might choose to go abroad and 
many companies might want to 
hire them if not for laws that limit 
legal immigration and the illegal 
route’s risks and high costs. In 
short, physical immigration has 
been steadily globalizing the labor 
market—but at a slower pace than 
the market would dictate.
Given the barriers and costs to 
physical immigration, it’s not sur-
prising that a signature feature of 
globalization’s third wave has been 
a technology-driven alternative—
virtual immigration.4 Work that 
doesn’t require local market knowl-
edge or face-to-face contact with 
customers is increasingly performed 
in far-flung locations and “shipped” 
back across national borders. 
Virtual immigration is an intui-
tively satisfying concept for the 
Information Age, but no country’s 
labor market reports measure it 
explicitly. So how can we track it? 
Much of virtual immigrants’ work 
involves importing or exporting 
specialized knowledge and infor-
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mation—just the kind of intangi-
bles that distinguish services from 
goods in international trade. 
Looking at U.S. services trade, 
we see a wide swath of economic 
activity, only some of it properly 
classified as virtual immigration. 
The key is physical separation 
between services providers and 
their customers, a distance bridged 
by remote delivery of work across 
international boundaries. 
An American company may 
send financial data to New Delhi, 
where an Indian bookkeeper cob-
bles it into a report. An American 
tourist may fly British Airways from 
New York to London. Services 
trade statistics would capture both 
transactions as imports, but only 
the bookkeeper can be called a 
virtual immigrant.
Now consider services exports. 
A U.S. consulting firm’s Dallas-
based staff may map out a long-
term strategic plan for a Taiwanese 
company. A surgeon may treat a 
Mexican patient at a San Antonio 
hospital. The consultants are virtual 
immigrants, not the doctor.
The U.S. tracks imports and 
exports for about two dozen 
types of services. Based on the 
Commerce Department’s descrip-
tions, nearly a third of the catego-
ries contain low concentrations of 
virtual immigrants. Three of them 
involve travel and transport. Others 
are hands-on business services—
for example, equipment installa-
tion, maintenance and repair. Low 
virtual immigration also character-
izes personal services such as med-
ical procedures and education.5
Two-thirds of the Commerce 
Department’s categories are likely 
to include high concentrations of 
virtual immigrants. They consist 
largely of business-to-business ser-
vices—computer and information 
processing, engineering, account-
ing, insurance, advertising, finance, 
legal work, leasing, management 
and consulting.6
U.S. exports and imports from 
high virtual immigration services 
industries have risen 180 percent 
since 1998, growing far faster 
than the low virtual immigration 
categories (Chart 2). Since over-
all services trade rose sharply in 
the decade, virtual immigration 
represents a growing share of an 
expanding pie, suggesting a labor 
market globalization that paral-
lels the one driven by physical 
immigration. 
Virtual immigration has 
become increasingly significant 
in the past decade as computer 
and telecommunications advances 
ratchet up our capacity to move 
vast amounts of data around 
the world cheaply and quickly. 
Particularly significant has been 
the Internet’s reaching critical 
mass in two key areas. First, it has 
spread widely enough to become 
an indispensable tool for modern 
international business. Second, 
data-transmission capacity has 
become big enough to move large 
amounts of information anywhere 
in the world.  
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For U.S. companies and entre-
preneurs, virtual immigration creates 
opportunities. Offshoring cuts pro-
duction costs and enhances global 
competitiveness, and U.S. services 
firms grow and profit by expand-
ing overseas. For workers, virtual 
immigration brings competition. U.S. 
computer programmers vie with 
lower-wage rivals in India, while 
U.S. lawyers, architects and con-
sultants take on foreign countries’ 
homegrown firms. 
Developing nations, with an 
abundance of relatively unskilled 
labor, focus on exporting routine 
services such as computer pro-
gramming, claims processing, debt 
collection and other back-office 
operations. These businesses are the 
mainstays of an offshoring industry 
in which India ranks as the global 
kingpin, employing about 800,000 
workers in 2007.7
Developed nations, with an 
abundance of highly skilled workers, 
gravitate toward exporting knowl-
edge-intensive and high-value-added 
services—the work of lawyers, 
accountants, architects, consultants 
and engineers. The U.S. has taken 
advantage of it. As the Internet facili-
tated a wave of virtual immigration, 
we saw the overall surplus in ser-
vices trade grow from $78.8 billion 
in 1998 to $161.4 billion in 2008. 
High virtual immigration cat-
egories account for eight of the 
11 industries with trade surpluses 
of better than two to one in 2008 
(Chart 3). We exported $830 for 
every $100 in imports in operational 
leasing, a segment of the indus-
try that handles short-term deals 
on airplanes, vehicles and other 
equipment.8
Our edge was six to one in 
distributing movies and televi-
sion shows and nearly four to one 
in architectural, construction and 
engineering services. Royalties and 
licensing fees, one of the largest 
categories in dollar terms, came out 
better than three to one, as did law, 
finance and advertising. Mining, 
education and medicine are among 
the low virtual immigration catego-
ries with surpluses. 
The U.S. imports more than it 
exports in a few high virtual immi-
gration categories. The deficits are 
relatively small in areas related 
to the offshoring of back-office 
functions—computer and informa-
tion services and accounting. Only 
in insurance did the U.S. run a sig-
nificant deficit, a persistent outcome 
that reflects foreign prowess in the 
reinsurance end of the business.
These patterns hold over time. 
The pecking order may change from 
year to year—for example, the big-
gest surpluses were for industrial 
engineering in 2006 and film and 
television in 2007—but the data 
consistently show the U.S. is highly 
competitive in a wide range of ser-
vices categories. Critics complain 
about U.S. jobs lost as services work 
goes overseas, but the trade data 
show virtual immigration is a two-
way street, going out as services 
imports and coming in as services 
exports.
Chart 3
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Facing Global Recession
Even in the favorable envi-
ronment of recent decades, labor 
market globalization generated a 
backlash. U.S. politicians and inter-
est groups, for example, have been 
railing against offshoring in par-
ticular and immigrants in general. 
These sentiments didn’t gain much 
traction while the nation needed 
foreign-born workers to build 
houses, assemble manufactured 
goods, handle back-office work 
and grow technology industries.
Now, labor market globaliza-
tion faces a stern test—a long, 
severe slump. As recession deep-
ened and spread, signs pointed to 
collapsing demand for immigrant 
labor. In the U.K., work applica-
tions from eight new European 
Union member states fell 50 per-
cent in the first three months of 
2009. Japan, Spain and the Czech 
Republic resorted to programs that 
paid foreign workers to go home. 
United Arab Emirates’ recruiting of 
new migrants declined 60 percent.
Take a look at America’s H-1B 
temporary work visas, awarded 
principally to educated foreigners. 
When the U.S. economy is grow-
ing, applications typically reach 
their cap minutes after online filing 
opens.9 In 2009, nearly a third of 
the slots were still available three 
months into the process, indicat-
ing companies had little immedi-
ate need to hire workers that in 
previous years had been in short 
supply.10
Mexico tracks the outflow of 
workers on a timely basis. Recent 
census reports show a precipitous 
drop in emigration—both legal and 
illegal—as the U.S. economy fal-
tered. The decline began in 2006—
at about the time the U.S. housing 
bubble burst, delivering a severe 
blow to homebuilding, a big 
employer of foreign-born workers. 
It continued in 2007 and 2008 as 
America’s economy plunged into 
recession (Chart 4). Mexican work-
ers have responded to the job mar-
ket’s deterioration by staying home 
and waiting for the U.S. economy 
to rebound.11
The U.S. Current Population 
Survey indicates recession has 
shrunk employment of foreign-
born workers. At the start of 2007, 
with the U.S. economy in growth 
mode, 25.6 percent of foreign-born 
workers had jobs in two highly 
cyclical industries—construction 
and manufacturing. Native-born 
workers’ exposure was 18 percent.
By October 2009, the reces-
sion was in its 22nd month, and 
foreign-born employment had 
fallen 35.4 percent from its peak 
in construction and 16 percent in 
manufacturing. The financial indus-
try, which provided work for 5.6 
percent of immigrants in January 
2007, cut foreign-born employment 
31.4 percent. The heavy toll in 
building and finance squares with 
a housing-led recession that roiled 
financial markets. Immigrants faced 
smaller job losses in some less-
cyclical sectors—for example, the 
Chart 4
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5.7 percent decline in leisure and 
hospitality. 
The data suggest that foreign-
born workers were among the 
first jettisoned as business activity 
soured. Employment fell at least 
two times faster for immigrants 
than for natives in mining, financial 
activities, nonhospital health care 
and two categories of professional 
services (Chart 5). Large gaps also 
show up in construction and trans-
portation and utilities. 
Overall, demand for foreign-
born labor declined 8.7 percent 
from its prerecession peak, well 
above the natives’ 5.5 percent 
rate. In recent months, the gap in 
job losses has shrunk, suggesting 
employers who began by laying 
off immigrants have now turned to 
trimming their payrolls by cutting 
native workers.  
All told, the anecdotal reports 
and data suggest physical migra-
tion is highly sensitive to the busi-
ness cycle in general and labor 
demand in particular. 
What about virtual immigra-
tion? Offshoring data are rarely 
reliable or up to date, creating 
difficulties for measuring the reces-
sion’s impact on sending work to 
low-wage nations overseas. Hard 
times might pressure companies to 
cut costs, quickening offshoring’s 
pace. At the same time, compa-
nies might pull back on offshoring 
because of cuts in IT budgets and 
plentiful labor close to home.
India shows these contradic-
tory forces at work. Forecasts call 
for continued expansion in the 
country’s software and IT services 
exports, a sign of relatively healthy 
demand for outsourcing (Chart 
6). However, the projected 17 
percent growth rate for these sec-
tors in 2009 is less than half the 
pace of the previous four years. 
Industry reports document deals 
being canceled or postponed and 
clients seeking price cuts of up to 
10 percent.12 
U.S. services provide another 
view on how virtual immigration 
responds to recession. Services 
trade in industries with high con-
centrations of virtual immigrants 
grew an average of 11.3 percent 
a year from 1998 to 2007. The 
growth rate slowed to 7.3 percent 
in 2008, the first year of the down-
turn.13 In the eight-month recession 
in 2001, the growth rate of these 
high virtual immigration categories 
retreated to 2.4 percent.
Several sectors actually sped 
up significantly in the recession 
year of 2008, led by R&D and test-
ing services, accounting, legal ser-
vices, management and consulting, 
and telecommunications (Chart 7). 
Finance, insurance and most other 
categories still grew last year—but 
at a slower pace. Only two catego-
ries showed outright declines—film 
and television rentals and industrial 
engineering. Data aren’t available 
to track services trade in high vir-
tual immigration industries into 
2009.
Chart 5
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Virtual immigration’s contin-
ued growth in recession contrasts 
with the evidence of declines in 
demand for physical immigrants in 
2008 and into 2009. Most likely, the 
difference stems from the jobs the 
two types of immigrants typically 
do. Physical immigrants work in 
construction and other highly cycli-
cal industries. Virtual immigrants 
are more likely to work in the 
services economy. It has tradition-
ally been less sensitive than goods 
to cyclical fluctuations, largely 
because services aren’t subject to 
the kind of inventory bulges that 
make goods production unstable.
Recession will pass. At some 
point, the world economy will 
begin to grow again, raising ques-
tions about whether the labor mar-
ket integration we’ve seen in glo-
balization’s third wave will resume 
and, if so, at what pace. 
The long-term economic forces 
that have propelled both physi-
cal and virtual immigration should 
reassert themselves once labor 
demand rebounds. Large wage dif-
ferentials and developing nations’ 
labor surpluses will once again 
spur migration to the richer coun-
tries. The same forces will create 
incentives for more companies to 
globalize production and cut costs 
through offshoring.
Cox is a senior fellow in the Dallas Fed’s 
Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 
and director of the William J. O’Neil 
Center for Global Markets and Freedom at 
Southern Methodist University’s Cox School of 
Business. Alm is a senior economics writer 
in the Dallas Fed’s Research Department. 
Dymerska, a former consultant in the 
Research Department, is an associate with 
Best Associates in Dallas.
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